Th e sentencing practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is a relatively neglected topic in academic discussions. Th e few empirical studies on sentencing of international crimes have focused primarily on the sentencing practice of its 'sister court', the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Unlike ICTY defendants, almost all ICTR defendants have been convicted of and sentenced for genocide -arguably the most serious international crime. Th is empirical study examines the sentencing practice of the ICTR and analyses the relationship between sentence severity and the primary consideration in sentencing -crime gravity. Th e relevant principles stemming from ICTR case law are reviewed, followed by an examination of the interrelationship between sentence severity and factors relating to crime gravity, such as category of crime, scale of crime and the form and degree of a defendant's involvement in the crime. Th e ICTR judges appear in most cases to follow the main principles emphasized in their case law, with sentences gradated in line with the increasing seriousness of defendants' crimes and their culpability.
Introduction
In 1994, a small group of hardliners within Rwanda's ruling party and military organized the most rapid extermination campaign of the 20 th century. Immediately after a presidential assassination, Hutu hardliners consolidated power in Rwanda, eliminated their main political opponents, formed an interim government, mobilized civilians and declared war on 'the Tutsi enemy'. Th e instructions were the same everywhere: eliminate the Tutsis. One hundred days later, the hardliners had lost the war and the violence had claimed hundreds of thousands of civilian lives. Th e main characteristic of the violence was the systematic annihilation of Rwanda's Tutsi minority. It was a deliberate, systematic, state-led campaign to eliminate a racially defi ned social group in an act of genocide.
1 Th e Hutu enacted their campaign with alarming effi ciency. In the one hundred days between 6 April and 19 July 1994, they murdered around 800,000 individuals. 2 Roughly, this means 333.3 deaths per hour, and fi ve and a half deaths per minute, with an even higher rate of murder in the fi rst four weeks. Th e Rwandan genocide, therefore, has the gruesome distinction of exceeding the rate of killing attained during the Holocaust. And unlike the Nazis, who used modern industrial technology to accomplish the most primitive of ends, the architects of the Rwandan genocide enlisted the wide support of citizens employing primarily low-tech and physically demanding instruments of death such as machetes, which required an intimacy with their victims. Th is genocide was executed with a brutality and sadism that defy the imagination. 3 Th e International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the UN Security Council in 1994 in response to these unimaginable atrocities. Its main purpose is to prosecute and hold persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda in 1994. 4 Th e ICTR has now been operating for more than fi fteen years and its judges have convicted and sentenced over 40 individuals, primarily the architects, leaders and orchestrators of the genocidal campaign. Together with its 'sister court', 5 the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), it has revived and further developed substantive and procedural international criminal law. ICTR case law in particular provides important legal and factual material in relation to genocide, as in the case, for example, of Akayesu . As well as being the fi rst international judgment to interpret the defi nition of genocide, it was also groundbreaking in that it affi rmed rape as a genocidal act. Th e Kambanda case, involving the prime minister in charge during the genocide, was the fi rst international judgment against a head of government; it also was the fi rst time anyone at that level had pleaded guilty to genocide.
6 Th e ICTR is also the fi rst international tribunal to have tackled the issue of the appropriate punishment for genocide ('the crime of crimes'), and its sentencing jurisprudence has established many important precedents. Th e main objective of this study is to empirically analyze the sentences handed down by the ICTR for genocide and other international crimes under its jurisdiction. ICTR jurisprudence on genocide has been discussed extensively in academic literature. 7 Several scholars have doctrinally analyzed ICTR sentencing case law, focusing on selected issues such as the purposes of international sentencing, 8 the principle of proportionality, 9 recourse to Rwandan domestic sentencing practice 10 or aggravating and mitigating factors. 11 Only limited attention, however, has focused on ICTR sentencing practice. To our knowledge, only one study has empirically analyzed the sentences announced by the ICTR. 12 Meernik examined the early ICTR verdicts and sentences by analyzing the sentences handed down to ten ICTR defendants, with a focus on the category of convicted crime, the level of power of a defendant, and aggravating and mitigating factors. Th e very small number of cases meant the analysis was limited to descriptive comparisons of sentences across diff erent categories of cases. Th e author concluded that ICTR sentencing appears to be in line with the standards dictated by the law. 13 Several empirical studies have analyzed ICTY sentencing, 14 while there have also been 16 None of these studies, however, focuses exclusively on the ICTR.
Consequently, very limited attention in academic discourse has been devoted to ICTR sentencing. Th ere are a few possible reasons for this relative neglect: the ICTR may be seen as operating in the shadow of the ICTY (it was established after the ICTY, the fi rst post-Cold War ad hoc international criminal tribunal); it is located in Arusha, Tanzania, far away from the main stage of international law and politics in Europe and the US, and it deals with an event that occurred in a distant African state. In addition, the law governing its functioning (the Statute 17 and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ['RoPE']) 18 is almost identical to that of the ICTY, while both tribunals have a common Appeals Chamber and used to have a common Prosecutor. Last but not least, the ICTY has ruled on many more cases and ICTY case law arguably covers a broader array of legal issues. Some commentators have also argued that ICTR fact-fi nding is of poor quality and have called for improvements.
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For several reasons, however, it is important to examine ICTR sentencing practice separately: (i) the ICTR is dealing predominantly with genocide charges and, in contrast to the ICTY, which has dealt with a wider variety of crimes, almost all those appearing at the ICTR have been convicted of genocide; (ii) the ICTR has primarily focused on higher-ranking orchestrators of crimes and government fi gures, while the ICTY, especially at the beginning, tried and sentenced many more lower-ranking hands-on executioners of persecutorial campaigns; and fi nally (iii) in contrast to the ICTY, life sentences are much more prevalent in ICTR sentencing practice. ICTR practice needs, therefore, to be examined in more detail in order to identify any variation in international sentencing for genocide committed by leaders and infl uential fi gures in a society.
Th is article consequently focuses exclusively on sentences handed down by the ICTR. Firstly, it doctrinally examines the mechanisms of sentence determination emerging from ICTR case law. Secondly, it empirically analyzes ICTR sentencing practice with a specifi c focus on the relationship between sentence severity and gravity of crime. We further develop previous studies by examining the multivariate associations between sentence severity and factors relevant to the assessment of 'the primary consideration in sentencing' -crime gravity -including the extent of crime, the category and type of convicted crime, the way and degree of defendants' participation in crime and their enthusiasm in committing crimes. Th e article begins with a brief discussion of ICTR sentencing law and a doctrinal analysis of the ICTR sentencing principles. In section 2, we outline the mechanisms of sentence determination according to the ICTR judges. Section 3 focuses on the empirical part of the study and describes the research protocol, including the data collection and methodology applied. Th e results of the empirical investigation are reported in section 4. Th e article concludes with a discussion of the empirical fi ndings in the light of the ICTR sentencing principles and the overall context of sentencing for international crimes.
ICTR Sentencing Law and Principles
Article 23 of the ICTR Statute contains only very basic guidelines as to what factors should be taken into account when imposing sentences: gravity of the off ence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. Th e Statute also instructs judges to have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda.
20 Th e Statute does not defi ne what is actually meant by the gravity of a crime or what individual circumstances should be relevant. No sentencing tariff for crimes under the Tribunal's jurisdiction is provided. Th e RoPE provide only very limited clarifi cation of how sentences should be determined. Indeed only one of the 126 provisions, Rule 101, deals with factors relevant to sentencing. Th is provision limits the range of applicable sentences, with the maximum sentence available to the judiciary being life imprisonment. Judges are also instructed to take into account any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances when determining sentences. However, no list of aggravating and mitigating factors is provided. Only two potential mitigating factors -"superior orders" 21 and "substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor" 22 -are explicitly mentioned. Consequently, judges have broad discretionary powers to determine sentences. Over time, more detailed sentencing principles have evolved in both ICTR and ICTY case law. 23 Sentence severity seems to be primarily determined by factors relating to the gravity of the crime (by assessing aggravating factors and applying the principles of proportionality, totality and gradation), and the sentence is then adjusted by taking into account the individual circumstances of the off ender, i.e. mitigating factors ('principle of individualization').
Litmus Test of Sentence Severity -Gravity of Crime
Th e starting point of sentence determination is the gravity of the off ence. Judges have described the gravity of the crime as the "litmus test". 24 In other words, the consideration of most importance in determining the appropriate sentence.
25 Th e principles of proportionality, totality and gradation seem to be the governing criteria in this respect: a penalty must refl ect the totality of the crimes committed by a person and be proportionate to the gravity of his or her crimes.
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In theory, the gravity can be determined in abstracto and in concreto . Th e gravity in abstracto is based on an analysis, in terms of criminal law, of the subjective and objective elements of the crime. Th e gravity in concreto depends on the harm done and on the culpability of the off ender.
27 ICTR judges arguably take into account both the gravity in abstracto of the crime and its gravity in concreto in determining the severity of a sentence. 28 Th e concrete (i.e. eff ective) gravity of crime seems, however, to be the most important consideration in meting out sentences as ICTR judges always emphasize the need to evaluate the gravity in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.
Regarding the gravity in abstracto , especially in early jurisprudence, the judges often emphasized the uniqueness of the crime of genocide because of its dolus specialis (the special intent that requires the crime to be committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such). Th e judges argued that, due to this special feature, genocide is labelled 23 ) Th e law governing sentence determination, as described above, is almost identical at the ICTY and ICTR. Th e principles of sentence determination developed from case law also seem very similar at the two tribunals. Indeed judges at one tribunal often refer to the case law of the other in their general sentencing considerations. Th e tribunals also share a joint Appeals Chamber, which contributes to the development of consistent jurisprudence. In this respect, the tribunals have developed a relatively consistent sentencing narrative, with similar basic principles emphasized in both jurisdictions. 24 Despite these pronouncements on equal gravity ( in abstracto ) of all international crimes, there are indications that genocide could be considered, by reason of its peculiar mens rea , as more serious than either war crimes or crimes against humanity. 33 From arguments presented in some cases it could be inferred that a conviction for genocide automatically entails the severest sentence, being life imprisonment. In Musema , for example, the Defence Counsel acknowledged on appeal that since the defendant had been convicted of genocide, it would be diffi cult to argue for a sentence other than life imprisonment. Th e Appeals Chamber confi rmed the sentence of life imprisonment despite quashing one of Musema's convictions for rape as a crime against humanity. 34 In Gacumbitsi the Appeals Chamber increased the trial sentence of 30 years to life imprisonment. It should be noted, however, that while confi rming the sentence, the appeal judges emphasized primarily the fact that the accused was involved in "several attacks that resulted in considerable number of victims" not the fact that he was convicted of genocide.
After noting that the Appellant had played a central role in the genocidal campaign in his commune of Rusumo, where thousands of Tutsi had been killed or seriously harmed, and noting his enthusiasm and sadism in instigating rapes, the judges emphasized that "unlike in most of the other cases in which those convicted for genocide have received less than a life sentence, there were no especially signifi cant mitigating circumstances here."
35 Th is statement implies that the 'default' sentence for genocide is life imprisonment, unless compelling mitigating factors are present. Th e reasoning along these lines was argued by the Prosecution in Rukundo and the Appeals Chamber dismissed it stating that " [j]ust as there is no category of cases ( … ) where the imposition of life imprisonment is per se barred, there is also no category of cases where it is per se mandated. Each case remains to be examined on its own individual facts". 36 Consequently, the legal label attached to the conduct is perceived only as a starting point of sentence determination. Given the inherent gravity of all the crimes in the Statute it is not suffi cient to cite the abstract gravity of the crime at the sentencing stage.
37 Th roughout the case law it is the gravity in concreto that is primarily emphasized. Judges have often argued that, in assessing the gravity of the off ence, "the Chamber ought to go beyond the abstract gravity of the crime to take into account the particular circumstances of the case, as well as the form and degree of the participation of the Accused in the crime".
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In most cases, the concept of gravity has been interpreted as encompassing two aspects: i) the particular circumstances of the case; in other words, the magnitude of harm caused by the off ender and represented by, for example, the scale of the crime, the number of victims, the extent of victims' suff ering, and ii) the form and degree of the accused's participation in the crime; in other words, the off ender's culpability.
Th e principle of gradation enables judges to diff erentiate between "crimes which are of the most heinous nature, and those which, although reprehensible and deserving severe penalty, should not receive the highest penalties". 39 Judges acknowledge that:
although there is no pre-established hierarchy between crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal ( … ) it is obvious that, in concrete terms, some criminal behaviours are more serious than others. Th e eff ective gravity of the off ences committed is the deciding factor in the determination of the sentence. Consequently, life imprisonment as the severest sentence available to judges should be reserved for the most serious off enders, 41 being those at the upper end of the sentencing scale, such as those who planned, led or ordered atrocities, or those who committed crimes with particular zeal or sadism. Accordingly, judges often reiterate that off enders receiving the most severe sentences tend to have been in senior positions of authority, such as ministers in the interim government. 42 However, very severe sentences can also be imposed on those at lower levels who zealously orchestrated or participated in crimes. Conversely, secondary or indirect forms of participation, such as complicity in genocide or facilitation of crime, usually result in lower sentences. 43 In Kayishema & Ruzinanda , for example, the judges enumerated the factors that distinguished the diff erent levels of culpability of the two accused, both of whom were convicted of genocide. Kayishema, the prefect of Kibuye, was convicted for his leading role and active participation in several massacres and attacks on sacred places such as churches. He was a leader in the genocide in Kibuye prefecture and instigated and ordered attacks resulting in the death of thousands of victims. Ruzinanda, a commercial trader in Kigali, played a leadership role during one attack and also personally participated in the killings. Th e judges emphasized the heinous means by which he committed murders such as the vicious nature of the murder of a sixteen-year old girl named Beatrice. Ruzinanda ripped off her clothes and slowly cut off one of her breasts with a machete. When he fi nished, he cut off her other breast while mockingly telling her to look at the fi rst one as it lay on the ground, and fi nally he tore open her stomach. 44 Despite the horrendous nature of Ruzinanda's acts the judges concluded that Kayishema deserved more punishment than Ruzinanda. Th e principal reasons for this decision can be traced back to the principle of gradation: Kayishema occupied a position of authority, while Ruzinanda did not. Kayishema's conviction also covered a more extensive crime base; he was educated, a medical doctor and, at the time of genocide, the prefect of Kibuye, who betrayed the ethical duty that he owed to his community. In addition, on at least one occasion, Kayishema instructed and praised Ruzinanda, thus indicating his more important and leading role in the atrocities. Taken together, these considerations led the judges to sentence Kayishema to life imprisonment, while Ruzinanda was given a sentence of 25 years. Since all the crimes coming before the ICTR are especially grave and reproachable and in many national jurisdictions would most probably attract the severest sentences, ICTR judges diff erentiate between 'serious and horrendous' and 'even more serious and horrendous' criminal acts. By applying the principle of gradation they seek to distinguish between diff erent degrees of individual culpability and gradate sentence severity accordingly, taking into account the role of the off ender in the overall confl ict situation. Th e severest sentences are reserved, therefore, for the most serious cases.
Fine-tuning of Appropriate Sentence -Individual Circumstances
As discussed above, sentence severity is primarily determined on the basis of considerations relating to the gravity of crime. Th e judges then adjust the sentence length by way of individualization, taking into account the personal and individual circumstances of each defendant. Th e individual circumstances are usually discussed under the heading of 'mitigating and aggravating factors'. Aggravating factors are circumstances directly related to the committing of the off ence for which the person has been charged and to the off enders themselves when they committed the off ence. Th erefore, they are linked with the assessment of the gravity of the crime in that they increase the seriousness of off ences committed. Th ey must be proven by the Prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt. 46 Th e standards applying in respect of mitigating factors are looser. Mitigating factors need to be established on the balance of probabilities and need not relate directly to the off ences for which the person has been charged. 47 Th e weight to be accorded to mitigating circumstances lies within the discretion of a Trial Chamber. 48 A fi nding of mitigating circumstances relates to the assessment of the sentence and in no way derogates from the gravity of crime nor diminishes the responsibility of convicted persons or lessens the degree of condemnation of their actions. Such a fi nding mitigates the punishment, not the crime. 49 A defendant can be sentenced to life imprisonment if the gravity of the off ence requires the imposition of the maximum sentence, even if judges identify mitigating circumstances. 50 Th e Tribunal has accepted a wide range of factors in aggravation/mitigation of a sentence. Whether a certain factor constitutes a mitigating or an aggravating circumstance depends largely on the particular circumstances of the case. In some cases, therefore, factors such as education or the respected status of a defendant 46 have been accepted in mitigation, 51 while in others they have aggravated the sentence. 52 It is not possible, therefore, to determine in absolute terms whether a certain factor will always be accepted by judges as aggravating or mitigating.
Th e most common aggravating factor cited by ICTR judges is abuse of a position of authority, leadership, infl uence or trust. Th e ICTY has held that a leadership position increases the relative seriousness of the crime if such a person abuses or wrongfully exercises the power stemming from that position. Th ose with authority over a group of people can infl ict more damage through this group than they would be able to infl ict alone. Moreover, the leader serves as an example for others to act in a similar way, and criminal behaviour by a leader is likely, therefore, to have a more serious eff ect. Furthermore, if a person holds a public position or a position of public duty and exploits it in order to commit or facilitate a crime, the relative seriousness of the crime is further increased by the breach of duty and the legitimate expectations attached to this position. 53 Direct and active criminal participation by fi gures in authority is always deemed to aggravate a sentence.
54 Similar considerations are refl ected in the sentencing arguments used by the ICTR. In Ndindabahizi , for example, the judges noted as particularly aggravating the facts that he (i) was a well known and infl uential fi gure in his native prefecture of Kibuye and abused the trust placed in him by the population; (ii) held an offi cial position in the interim government and, instead of promoting peace and reconciliation in his capacity as minister, he supported and advocated a policy of genocide; (iii) personally participated in the massacres in Gitwa Hill, during which thousands of people were killed; and (iv) actively infl uenced and encouraged others to take part in massacres.
55 Th e judges have argued along similar lines in the majority of ICTR cases concerning national, regional or even local leadership fi gures.
Th e most common mitigating factor cited by ICTR judges is 'assistance to victims'. It should not be assumed, however, that assistance to victims is always accepted in mitigation. Indeed judges often reject defendants' requests for sentence mitigation on these grounds. In particular, 'selective assistance to victims' does not necessarily result in sentence mitigation. In some ICTR judgments Trial Chambers have refused to accept this factor in mitigation or have even indicated that it could aggravate a sentence. In the following paragraphs, we empirically analyze how factors related to the primary consideration in sentencing, which according to the ICTR judges is the gravity of the crime, are refl ected in sentence severity. Our analysis includes factors relating to the gravity in abstracto (i.e. the category of convicted crime) and the gravity in concreto (i.e., the extent of criminal activity, defendants' ranks and roles in the crime, the type of underlying off ence and the particular degree of zeal in committing the crime). Th e following section outlines the methodology used and method of data collection.
Methodology
ICTR defendants are usually convicted on multiple counts, but receive one overall sentence. Th is single sentence is not broken down to refl ect the extent to which each count contributes to the total length. It is impossible, therefore, to see how each conviction is refl ected in the overall sentence; in this respect sentencing lacks transparency. Th is makes any statistical analysis of ICTR sentencing difficult. If we were to seek to extract the contribution of individual factors to sentence length, a statistical method such as multiple regression analysis would be the most appropriate.
57 However, the low number of cases and the high incidence of life sentences at the ICTR make it impossible to use regression (or any similar statistical method) to analyze ICTR sentencing practice. 58 We therefore performed a more exploratory study by using homogeneity analysis: a descriptive method that seeks to identify multivariate associations among selected variables. 59 57 ) Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique that attempts to use independent variables to predict a dependent variable, i.e. sentence length. It seeks a combination of predictors (i.e. legal factors) that best predict the sentence. It then enables assessment of the relative importance of the individual predictors, given the eff ect of other variables in the model. 58 ) Th ere are several reasons why regression analysis cannot be used: (i) the number of ICTR cases (the dataset) is very limited compared to the number of possible predictors and (ii) a solution would be too dependent on the value ascribed to the life sentences, and the distribution of dependent variables (even after recoding life sentences) would be very skewed. 59 ) Homogeneity analysis is a non-linear, multivariate technique used mainly to explore and summarize data (its objective is not a confi rmatory data analysis or statistical model testing). Th is technique is particularly suitable for dealing with categorical variables. It assigns numerical values to the categories and then treats those rescaled variables as if they were continuous. As the 'optimal scaling techniques' do not make any distributional assumptions, they are particularly suitable here since all the variables in our dataset are categorical and there is a prevalence of life sentences at the ICTR. Th e solution enables a researcher to investigate multivariate relationships between all categorical variable simultaneously, i.e. to analyze all the legal factors included in the analysis together. Researchers can use homogeneity analysis to explore and interpret the structure in the categorical data. However, the technique (in contrast, for example, to regression analysis)
Data Collection
All the 44 individuals sentenced by the ICTR in the period to 31 March 2011 were included in the analysis. Th is number includes all fi nalized sentences (i.e. sentences pronounced by a Trial Chamber without an appeal, or sentences modifi ed or confi rmed by an Appeals Chamber) and all sentences handed down by a Trial Chamber in cases still pending on appeal. 60 All information was obtained from written versions of the judgments published on ICTR web pages.
61 Th e following data were collected from the ICTR judgments for each defendant: a) the length of the fi nal sentence before any reduction due to time spent in detention; b) the category of crime of which a defendant was convicted; c) the scale of crime; d) the rank in the military or political hierarchy and e) the way in which defendants participated in crime (their main role).
All the variables were then coded as indicated in Table 1 . Sentence length was coded as a 5-category variable encompassing short sentences (0 -10 years), medium sentences (11 -20 years), long sentences (21 -30 years), very long sentences (31 -45 years) 62 and life imprisonment. Category of crime relates to the gravity of crime in abstracto and was coded as a 5-category variable indicating a combination of separate categories of crime of which a defendant was convicted, i.e. war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Th e gravity of crime in concreto is represented by two diff erent variables: the scale of crime (indicating the overall harm caused by the individual defendants) and the rank of defendants combined with their typical role in crime (indicating their personal culpability). Th e scale of crime was coded as a 4-category variable capturing the scope of the defendant's criminal activity. From the judges' argumentation, it appears that the more extensive the criminal activity, the graver the crimes are considered as they entailed higher numbers of victims, were committed over longer periods of time and often involved more people executing crime. Cases were divided into four categories on the basis of the overall factual background underlying each defendant's conviction. We distinguished between (i) incidental crime, being those individuals convicted on the basis of isolated incidents such as involvement in a single attack or several attacks not committed over a protracted period of time; (ii) recurrent/extensive crime, whereby does not provide information on the statistical properties of the solution. Th e conclusion based on the homogeneity analysis cannot therefore be generalized. defendants were convicted on the basis of repeated crimes committed over a longer period of time; (iii) propaganda, whereby defendants were convicted on the basis of conduct that promoted crimes of others (general incitement), such as those associated with the RTLM radio station; and fi nally (iv) campaign, where defendants (offi cials with power over others) were found responsible for a wide array of crimes committed within a regional or state-wide genocidal campaign.
Th e personal culpability of defendants is represented by a variable combining their position in the whole confl ict (i.e. their rank) and their typical role in the particular criminal acts of which they were convicted. In this way "the form and degree of participation of the accused in the crime" is best captured. As discussed above, ICTR judges have often argued that sentences are gradated in line with the rank in the overall system; however, the defendant's position is not the only relevant consideration when assessing culpability. It is also important to establish how perpetrators personally contributed to violence: whether they passively stood by while being under a duty to intervene, whether they more actively facilitated the committing of crime of others by, for example, providing ammunition or whether they enthusiastically took part in killing and personally committed massacres. Especially in the case of higher-ranking infl uential fi gures it is often emphasised that their personal participation in massacres is a particularly important aggravating factor.
Th e rank of the off ender was coded as a 3-category variable, distinguishing between low-ranking, middle-ranking and high-ranking individuals. Lowranking off enders, such as rank and fi le soldiers, local politicians or individuals occupying positions such as a hospital doctor, commercial trader or a singer, held little or no power in the overall circumstances of the confl ict. Middle-ranking individuals, such as more senior army commanders, conseilleurs, bourgemesters , pastors and priests in the Catholic church or leaders of the Interahamwe , had more extensive de jure or de facto power and/or authority to command or infl uence the conduct of others. Finally, high-ranking off enders comprise regional or national military and political leaders such as prefects, members of the national government, military offi cers above the rank of colonel or military commanders of operational sectors (being the military equivalent of a prefecture in Rwanda).
Th e typical role of a defendant was coded as a 6-category variable: 64 (i) main architects who devised a genocidal campaign and actively implemented it at state level; (ii) organizers who implemented the policies and played an organizational role (for example, planning, ordering or coordinating crime); (iii) hands-on organizers who not only coordinated crime committed by others, but also personally took part in atrocities; (iv) executioners who implemented genocidal campaigns on the ground and personally committed crimes; (v) helpers who mainly played an ancillary role by, for example, providing ammunition, active encouragement or logistical activities; and (vi) bystanders whose role was mainly passive, such as superiors who did not intervene when their subordinates were committing crimes. Th e rank and role of a defendant was then combined into one variable expressing that individual's personal culpability.
All the above variables were included in the analysis as active variables, with the ultimate solution being based on multivariate associations among these factors. Additionally, we collected information on a) the type of underlying criminal conduct; b) the mode of liability of which a defendant was convicted; c) whether a defendant pleaded guilty to the charges; and d) whether a defendant participated in crime particularly zealously or enthusiastically. Th ese factors were then added to the analysis as passive variables to see where cases sharing these characteristics were placed in the solution (see Table 2 ). 65 Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes could all be committed through a wide variety of punishable acts listed in the respective articles of the ICTR Statute. Th ese 'underlying off ences' diff er in character and range from killings involving torture, rape and inhuman treatment to property-related off ences. Th e type of underlying off ence of which a defendant is convicted relates to the assessment of the gravity in concreto of the crime since it clearly expresses the nature of the person's criminal behaviour. Th e underlying off ence was coded as a 65 ) See below for more details of the methodology and the distinction between active and passive variables.
Variable Measurement Proportion
Underlying 66 -of which a defendant was convicted. Since all the ICTR defendants were convicted of killing we examined all the possible combinations of criminal conduct to see whether any diff erences in sentence severity could be identifi ed.
Th e judges use modes of individual liability to characterize an accused's participation in crime. Th ese are provided for in Article 6 of the ICTR Statute, which distinguishes between superior responsibility and other modes of individual liability. In other words, individuals are responsible for a crime if they plan, instigate, order, commit or otherwise aid and abet its planning, preparation or execution. Participation in a joint criminal enterprise ('JCE') must be added to this list as a specifi c mode of liability used especially by the ICTY. 67 We coded each mode of liability of which a defendant was convicted as a separate variable.
We also included the variable indicating whether a defendant pleaded guilty to the charges. It has been argued in literature that a guilty plea is one of the most signifi cant factors accepted by judges in mitigation. 68 In order to see the relationship between a guilty plea and sentence severity we coded a guilty plea as a dichotomous variable and included it in the analysis.
Finally we included the variable indicating whether the accused participated in crime zealously and with particular enthusiasm. As part of the principle of gradation the ICTR judges have often emphasised that lower-ranking off enders participating in atrocities with a particular zeal or sadism deserve severe sentences. We recorded all cases where judges explicitly noted a defendant's zeal, sadism or enthusiasm and coded zeal as a dichotomous variable.
Method
Th e collected data were then analyzed using multiple correspondence analysis (homogeneity analysis). Th is exploratory technique examines the multivariate associations between sentence severity and the selected case characteristics (in other words, factors relating to the gravity of crime, such as category of crime, 66 ) Only one defendant has been convicted by the ICTR of an off ence other than violence or murder. As well as being convicted of murder, violence and torture Samuel Imanishimwe was convicted of 'imprisonment' under Article 4c because of having ordered subordinates to detain civilians. As this was the only case in the whole sample, we included it in the category of murder combined with violence and torture; Prosecutor extent of criminal activity, rank of the off ender and the method of participating in criminal activities). Homogeneity analysis reduces complicated multivariate data structures to two-dimensional plots displaying all analyzed cases and their respective characteristics. 69 For this purpose a statistical software package HOMALS (Homogeneity Analysis by Alternating Least Squares, i.e. multiple correspondence analysis) in the SPSS.18 was used. In HOMALS all individual cases are related to their characteristics according to the principle of each case being located within the solution as closely as possible to its characteristics and, conversely, a characteristic being positioned as closely as possible to cases sharing that characteristic. In doing so, HOMALS attempts to achieve as much discrimination between categories as possible.
70 Th e multivariate structuring of characteristics and cases can be interpreted. If, for instance, three characteristics are typically found in a number of cases, the technique will in all likelihood position these characteristics in the same area of the solution. Th e cases will be located close to these characteristics. Th ese cases then constitute what is regarded as a homogeneous group as the group is homogeneous with respect to these characteristics. 71 In HOMALS, the position of a case in the solution is referred to as the 'object score'. Th e position of a characteristic is referred to as the 'category quantifi cation'. Th e category quantifi cation of a characteristic is equal to the average object score of all cases sharing that characteristic, while, conversely, a case's object score is the average of the category quantifi cations of its characteristics. Th e results can be interpreted by examining a position of categories and cases in the solution. Category quantifi cations that are placed together tend to occur together. Clusters (subgroups) of object scores indicate that homogeneous subgroups exist for which patterns or profi les of category quantifi cations are typical. By combining the interpretation of the category quantifi cations and groups of object scores, groups of cases can be labelled in terms of their typical characteristics. As a rule of thumb, the more peripheral groups are more particular and distinct; cases placed in the centre of the solution have either a fairly average pattern or unusual combinations of characteristics. Similarly, category quantifi cations placed in the centre are not typical for certain cases, but instead are shared by many. 72 It should be noted that HOMALS is not a cluster analysis as such. Th erefore, diff erences between individual groups (clusters) are gradual and fuzzy rather than distinct and absolute.
In the present analysis we sought to distinguish the ICTR cases/defendants on the basis of the sentence severity and gravity of crime as discussed by the ICTR judges. Th e HOMALS solution presented is based on sentence length, category of convicted crime, scale of crime and defendant's rank combined with the manner in which defendants participated in crime. Th ese active variables are used to distinguish between the individual cases and to form the individual groups. We subsequently passively analyzed a number of other factors that arguably may have infl uenced sentence length in a particular case, such as the type of underlying off ence, mode of liability, guilty plea and zeal. Th ese passive variables do not infl uence the solution, but helped us to explore ICTR sentencing practice in more detail and to interpret the solution. 
Results
Th e HOMALS analysis produced a solution with a satisfactory fi t (1.271 out of maximum 2). 74 We can thus conclude that cases are well distinguishable on the basis of the selected characteristics. Figures 1 and 2 present the plots of object scores and category quantifi cations. Th e solution can be interpreted by examining these plots. Th e patterns are described, moving clockwise through the periphery of the solution. As noted above, the more central categories are less typical, while those at the periphery of a solution make the best distinction among the individuals.
In the upper right corner of the solution are the individuals convicted for passive, acquiescent behaviour -the lower ranking bystanders (some were classifi ed as low-ranking and some as middle-ranking). Th ese defendants were all convicted for failing to intervene in massacres and acting as 'approving spectators' 75 or 'accomplices by omission' 76 or were superiors who failed to investigate or punish crime committed by their subordinates. 77 Th ey all pleaded guilty and were convicted solely of crimes against humanity. Th ey admitted to having participated in one attack or in several separate incidents. Th eir involvement in atrocities was thus rather limited.
78 Th e sentences imposed on these defendants were the lowest 73 ) Th e passive analysis enables additional characteristics to be placed alongside those on which the actual solution is based. Consequently, a researcher can see where cases sharing these characteristics are placed in a plot and can interpret results of the analysis in more detail. 78 ) Th ese factors may all relate to the fact that all these defendants pleaded guilty and entered into a plea agreement with the Prosecutor. By pleading guilty to crimes against humanity (even though handed down by the ICTR, arguably on account of the factors referred to above: guilty plea, very limited crime base and very limited involvement in crime. Th e next cluster of individuals is located to the left, slightly lower in the solution. All these individuals were classifi ed as middle-ranking helpers and were convicted on account of their facilitating role in crime committed by others. Although their role in the crimes was more active than that of the fi rst group, they did not kill or torture anybody with their own hands. which was heavily involved in inciting the public to participate in massacres. 80 However, little else is typical for the group placed here in the solution. Th eir form and degree of participation is the defi ning characteristic for these defendants. Some were convicted for having participated in a few attacks or even a few incidents, while others provided assistance throughout the whole period of genocide and a third group was active on radio RTLM and 'assisted' massacres by inciting the masses to participate in the killings. Th ese defendants were convicted of genocide or a combination of genocide and crimes against humanity (either extermination or persecution). Although the solution suggests that their sentences range from 11 -20 years, a more detailed examination of the cases in this group shows that the punishment actually ranges from very short sentences (6 and 8 years imprisonment 81 for two individuals who pleaded guilty to their charges and are therefore positioned closer to the category of 0-10 years) to longer terms of imprisonment of up to 30 years 82 (a position of this case is thus pulled more towards the 21 -30 years sentence category).
A small group of three defendants was placed below this cluster. Th e main defi ning characteristic of these individuals was that they were all active in propaganda. One was a journalistic broadcaster for RTLM, while another was a popular singer in Rwanda who, as well as singing discriminatory songs, openly called on the population to "rise up and exterminate the minority, the Tutsi" 83 and the third was a military offi cer convicted on the basis of his infl ammatory speech at a single meeting. 84 All three were lower-ranking individuals 85 who had no significant power over others and were convicted of incitement to commit genocide. Like the previous group, they did not actively participate in massacres and never personally killed anybody. Th ey were all classifi ed as active helpers. Th ey were convicted of genocide or a combination of genocide and crimes against humanity and were sentenced to medium-length imprisonment terms of between 12 and 15 years.
Moving upwards, towards the left-hand side, there is one case of a low-ranking organizer who also personally committed horrendous crimes. Obed Ruzinanda, a commercial trader in Kigali, played a very active part in the massacres by distributing weapons, transporting attackers and leading a group of perpetrators during an attack. He also personally committed some of the crimes, and the judges specifi cally condemned his zeal and the heinous means by which he committed the killings. 86 He was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment. Th e next cluster of cases is placed closer to the middle of the solution. In general, these are individuals who played a more active role in massacres, such as organizers or hands-on executioners. In the lower part of this group are two lowranking defendants who were sentenced to relatively long terms of imprisonment (25 and 30 years respectively). Gerard Ntakirutimana, who was a medical doctor, was found to have led attackers against Tutsi refugees and to have participated in these attacks with a particular zeal, 87 while Gaspard Kanyarukiga, a businessman, was convicted of planning with others the attack on Nyange church which resulted in more than 2000 Tutsi deaths.
88 Towards the middle of the solution can be found the more senior and infl uential fi gures who primarily played organizational and coordinating roles. Most of these individuals were convicted of genocide in combination with crimes against humanity, and their criminal involvement was relatively extensive as they either participated in numerous attacks or committed crimes over longer periods of time. Th e crime basis of their convictions constituted killing, sometimes in combination with violence and torture. Many of them were convicted as perpetrators, some as planners or participants in a joint criminal enterprise. Th eir sentences have generally been long, ranging from 25 to 45 years' imprisonment. At the top of this group there are also some high-ranking fi gures (a senior government offi cial at the Ministry of the Interior 89 and a senior military offi cer). 90 Despite their high-ranking positions these individuals received relatively short sentences of 25 years compared with all the other high-ranking defendants, who are located more in the upper left of the solution and usually received sentences of life imprisonment. Th is could be because the fi rst two individuals were convicted for several attacks that were limited in scope and place, and their roles were also rather limited (Kalimanzira, for example, was convicted for having been repeatedly involved in massacres in the prefecture of Butare, but the Trial Chamber noted that "the charges relate to crimes committed in his own préfecture and not crimes committed at the national level. Moreover, although he was the Directeur de Cabinet of the Ministry of the Interior, the crimes for which he is convicted are essentially unrelated to his offi cial duties and powers at the national level". 91 Setako was found guilty of ordering the killings of 40 individuals and the Trial Chamber took into account that he was not "an architect of the larger body of crimes committed in Ruhengeri prefecture" 92 ). Moving up towards the top left corner of the plot there is a group of individuals on whom the ICTR imposed the severest sentences: life imprisonment. All these defendants were convicted of extensive criminal activities or organization of regional/national campaigns of genocide. Usually they were found guilty of genocide in combination with crimes against humanity and in some cases also with war crimes. Th ese are the defendants convicted of many types of underlying off ences -next to killing many of them actively committed or promoted rape and other forms of violence. Th eir criminal conduct was classifi ed as ordering or instigating, often in combination with aiding and abetting and/or superior responsibility. Th e defi ning characteristic of these defendants is their status in society and the overall state hierarchy; they were all authority fi gures who exercised more extensive power over the masses. In many cases they were classifi ed as high-ranking; indeed, some were government ministers. At the top of this group can be found the two cases classifi ed as the main architects of the Rwandan genocide: Jean Kambanda, prime minister of the interim government, 93 and Th eoneste Bagosora, the most senior offi cial at the Ministry of Defence during the genocide. 94 However, there are also several instances of very severe sentences being imposed on middle-ranking defendants, specifi cally when these individuals next to their coordinating role also personally participated in massacres and killed, raped or tortured their victims. Despite not being the highest authorities during the confl ict all these perpetrators received the severest sentences on account of their personal and often enthusiastic participation in massacres. Th ere is also one case of a middle-ranking executioner, Mikaeli Muhimana, who was a municipal councillor in Gishyita and personally murdered and raped many Tutsis with terrifying cruelty and sadism. 95 Lastly a small group of three individuals was placed to the right of the cluster of high-ranking architects, organizers and zealous executioners. Although this group was also sentenced to life imprisonment, there are some factors distinguishing these individuals from other defendants given a life sentence. Either their participation was relatively passive or their crimes were limited to one attack. One, Aloys Ntabakuze, was convicted for failing to intervene in crimes committed by his subordinates and was therefore classifi ed as a bystander.
96 Th e other, Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, a Minister of Higher Education, was convicted for having organized a single attack at Gikomero Parish Compound. His crimes were spatially very limited and his criminal conduct was classifi ed as incidental. during an attack in Nyange parish. During the attack, Seromba identifi ed the weakest parts of his church (where Tutsis were hiding) as targets for bulldozer drivers and later also encouraged the attackers to fi nish off any survivors. His role was therefore relatively passive as he did not actively help the attackers or personally commit violence. Th e Appeals Chamber, however, reclassifi ed his conduct as committing and increased his sentence to life imprisonment. 98 Given these defendants' relatively limited role and/or the fact that their guilt is based on participation in a single attack, these cases were positioned more to the right of the solution and so closer to category quantifi cations expressing only incidental involvement and/or a passive/bystander role.
Discussion and Conclusions
Th e main aim of this study was to empirically analyze ICTR sentencing practice. Firstly, we briefl y discussed the main sentencing principles stemming from the judges' reasoning and then explored the multivariate relationships between the sentencing factors relating to the assessment of the gravity of the crime and sentence severity. Th e results showed that patterns in ICTR sentencing could be identifi ed.
Defendants sentenced by the ICTR were structured in a two-dimensional solution for which we can identify two axes: an activity axis running diagonally through the solution and a culpability level axis running perpendicular to this (see Fig. 3 ). Along the fi rst axis, running from the top right-hand corner of the solution, individuals are distinguished on the basis of their passive or active participation in crime. In this respect, two very distinct groups can be distinguished at the two extremes of this axis: (i) passive participants convicted for being present at a crime scene or for failing to intervene while under a duty to do so, and (ii) more active participants who actively contributed to massacres and either actively assisted actual perpetrators, personally committed the killings or organized the crime. Th e sentences are then distributed accordingly: the very short sentences are in principle reserved for passive off enders, while more severe sentences are imposed on active contributors.
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Along the second axis, the group of actively participating defendants is distinguished on the basis of their culpability level. Th e latter is determined primarily by a combination of three indicators: (i) the defendant's position in the overall society (whether and to what extent a defendant exercised any de facto or de jure power over other individuals); (ii) the extent of involvement in atrocities (whether a defendant merely facilitated crime committed by others, or personally committed or organized the violence), and (iii) overall harm (whether a defendant is found guilty of participating in a limited number of or multiple/ recurrent attacks). Along this dimension we can identify three distinct groups: (i) supporters and inciters; (ii) organizers and fi eld executioners (generally middle-ranking) 100 and (iii) high-level organizers of regional or state-wide criminal campaigns and enthusiastic (middle-ranking) organizers who also personally committed the crimes. Th e fi rst two groups are at the lower end of this axis and were generally sentenced to determinate sentences, while the third group is at the upper end of this axis and most of its members were sentenced to life imprisonment. 101 sentences could be the result of a combination of these factors: their guilty plea, the very limited crime base and their very limited involvement in crime. 100 ) Th is group also includes a few high-ranking defendants whose criminal involvement, however, was limited (either they merely assisted others or they were convicted for having participated in a single attack). 101 ) In the case of three ICTR defendants, sentences of life imprisonment were imposed despite these individuals' relatively limited participation in crime compared to other defendants who Our empirical analysis indicated that the principles discussed in ICTR sentencing jurisprudence are generally refl ected in ICTR sentencing practice. Regard ing the gravity in abstracto , our analysis confi rmed that being convicted of genocide (the 'crime of crimes') does not automatically result in the severest sentence of life imprisonment. Th ere have been many cases in which defendants were convicted of genocide and received a determinate (and sometimes short) sentence. In fact, almost all ICTR defendants have been convicted of genocide and life imprisonment does not seem to be the Tribunal's default sentence. It should also be noted that the shortest sentences pronounced by judges were in the few cases in which defendants were not convicted of genocide. In most of these cases, however, the defendants pleaded guilty to a very limited crime base and participation.
102 What seems to be the most important consideration in sentencing is the gravity of defendants' crimes in concreto . In other words, the overall harm caused and their culpability, not the legal classifi cation of their acts.
With respect to gravity in concreto , the most severe sentences have been handed out, in line with the principle of gradation, to defendants who occupied the most senior positions in the civil or military hierarchy and organized massacres from behind their desks or to those who participated in crime with particular zeal and sadism. However, those sentenced to life imprisonment seem as a rule to have been people who exercised some authority over others. No low-ranking defendant, no matter how enthusiastic or zealous, has yet been sentenced to life imprisonment. 103 Consequently, leadership fi gures seem to be regarded as the most culpable for the purposes of ICTR sentencing. Th eoretically, international crimes are perceived as a manifestation of collective, large-scale and systematic violence, and it is often argued that violence on such a large scale never breaks out without the instrumental role of top organizers. Th erefore, also theoretically, the highest-level leadership fi gures are considered the most blameworthy in the event received the severest sentence. Th ese cases are to the right of the group of high-level organizers and enthusiasts. In none of these cases did the judges elaborate on why the severest sentence was justifi ed despite the individuals' relatively limited involvement in genocide compared to many others sentenced to life imprisonment. See supra notes 96-98. In Seromba the judges emphasized the egregious character of his crime and the fact that he "knew that approximately 1,500 refugees were in the church and that they were bound to die or be seriously injured as a consequence of his approval that the church be bulldozed." Although this criminal conduct is certainly very serious, it may be questioned whether Seromba belongs to the most culpable perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide, when compared with other defendants sentenced to life imprisonment for their very active role in organizing massacres of hundreds of thousands of people. See Seromba , supra note 98, para. 238. 102 ) In the only case in which a conviction was not based on a guilty plea, the defendant, Imanishimwe , was convicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes (after the Appeals Chamber quashed his conviction for genocide) and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. However, his conviction was also limited to participation in several incidents; Imanishimwe, supra note 66, paras. 442-444. 103 ) Cf . Ruzinanda , supra note 44; Ntakirutimana , supra note 32. of such crimes. 104 On the other hand, it is also true that the ICTR does not automatically sentence all high-ranking defendants to life imprisonment. If the conviction of these senior fi gures is limited in scope (if, for example, the crime basis is limited to a single attack or the degree of involvement is very limited), their sentences tend to be more lenient. ICTR judges seem therefore to weigh the position of defendants in the overall confl ict against the level of their involvement in crime. Although sentence severity and the actual rank in the state hierarchy in principle correspond, a defendant's exact role and level of involvement in the atrocities also play an important part in sentence determination.
Th is empirical analysis of ICTR sentencing practice is one of the few studies of international sentencing focusing exclusively on the Rwanda Tribunal. It further develops an emerging scholarship empirically evaluating the sentences imposed for international crimes. 105 Our study concentrates primarily on the relationship between sentence severity and crime gravity -the primary consideration in sentencing -at one international tribunal, the ICTR. Th ere are, however, many other aspects of international sentencing that need to be addressed in further empirical or doctrinal research. One such question at a micro-level is the role of individual circumstances in sentence determination. In the majority of cases, judges consider individual circumstances to be mitigating or aggravating. Given that all crimes coming before international judges are extremely grave and that, based on their gravity alone, the severest sentences would be justifi ed (and indeed are often imposed), the question of the role played by mitigating and aggravating factors in sentence determination can be examined. As a related issue, the principle of sentences proportional to crime gravity should also be analyzed and conceptualized specifi cally for international crimes. How should we understand proportionality in the case of sentencing for international crimes that are the most serious known to humankind? Is a sentence of 25 years indeed proportional in cases involving multiple killings committed with the intent to eliminate a whole ethnic or religious group? Can we draw any conclusions in this respect on the basis of the sentencing case law and practice of the international courts and tribunals and/or domestic courts? At the macro-level, what are the relationships and infl uences, from a perspective of sentencing for international crimes, among the international criminal courts and tribunals that have emerged in the past decade? In view of the principle of complimentarity, one of the governing principles at the International Criminal Court, infl uences between domestic courts dealing with international crimes and their international counterparts also need to be examined. Consequently, many question marks still remain when it comes to sentencing of international crimes, and further theoretical and empirical research of the phenomenon of international punishment and sentencing practice is needed for these questions to be answered.
